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Abstract 
Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which 
emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study 
proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments 
based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced 
emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), 
and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on 
moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger 
would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal 
motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function 
of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning 
impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. 
These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that 
their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced 
emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal 
scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an 
abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can 
be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important 
implications for moral psychology, as it point towards a previously overlooked mechanism 
linking emotions to moral judgments. 
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Over the years, the role of emotions in morality has been the source of large 
controversies in moral philosophy and psychology. Philosophers have debated whether we 
should consider our emotional reactions when defining a certain action as morally 
permissible or not (Hume, 1777/1960; Kant, 1785/1959), while psychologists have 
traditionally focused on empirical research, in particular a) whether moral judgments stem 
from intuitions or from conscious reasoning, and b) which psychological processes are 
involved in moral intuitions (Cushman et al. 2010). Battling on these issues, scholars have 
neither been able to focus on providing a detailed account of the specific mechanisms through 
which emotions affect moral judgments nor on the contextual elements favoring the 
emotional involvement in the production of moral judgments. Providing a better 
understanding of the interaction between types of emotions with particular types of moral 
judgments is therefore the main objective of our paper. Furthermore, we will try to delineate 
some of the circumstances under which moral judgments are more likely to rely on emotional 
processes. 
The two issues mentioned above have been at the core of the moral psychology debate 
in the last decade. It has been suggested that moral judgments result mainly from intuitions 
and that these intuitions are of emotional nature (Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2006; Schnall et al., 
2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). Haidt & colleagues, for instance, proposed that moral 
judgments are largely influenced by our “gut feelings”, an idea previously suggested by 
Hume (1777/1960). To test this, Haidt and colleagues (Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & 
Haidt, 2005) developed a series of moral vignettes describing violations of moral norms that 
are strongly connected to feelings of disgust. For instance, one of the most representative 
scenarios describes two siblings who decide to have sexual intercourse. Haidt hypothesized 
that such a scenario would induce a feeling of disgust in the participants and that this feeling 
would influence the outcome of their judgment concerning whether the protagonists’ 
intention is morally permissible. Different techniques were used to induce disgust in several 
studies, including hypnosis (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) and disgusting smells (Schnall et al., 
2008). These studies showed that the induction of disgust led to more severe moral 
judgments, supporting the hypothesis that moral judgments are linked to primary emotions, in 
this case, disgust. Furthermore, Schnall et al. (2008) showed that the effect on moral 
judgments was specific for disgust and not for other emotions, such as sadness, indicating 
that disgust is specifically linked to moral judgments related to scenarios that might trigger 
disgust. For this reason, these types of moral scenarios are labeled disgust-related in the 
present paper. 
An alternative theory agrees that moral judgments result from intuitions, but denies 
any role for emotions in the formation of moral judgments, claiming that moral intuitions 
result from a moral specific psychological mechanism labeled “universal moral grammar” 
which focuses mostly on the protagonist’s intentions in order to determine whether an action 
is permissible or not (Hauser, 2006; Huebner et al., 2008; Mikhail 2007). More importantly, 
the “moral grammar” (for a critique of this theory, see Dupoux & Jacob 2007) is independent 
of both emotional and cognitive mechanisms. According to this view, emotional and 
cognitive processes are typically activated after a moral judgment has been made. Emotions 
and reasoning thus have no causal role in determining moral judgments (Hauser, 2006; 
Huebner et al., 2008). Using personal and impersonal moral scenarios similar to those 
introduced by Greene et al. (2001) in the moral psychology literature, Cima et al. (2010) 
provided the strongest evidence against the claim that emotions are related to moral 
judgments by showing that psychopaths’ moral judgments do not differ from those of healthy 
participants. This has been interpreted as contradictory to the claim that emotions play a role 
in determining moral judgments, as psychopaths are known to have impaired affective 
processing (Blair et al., 2005). 
To further test the hypothesis that it is the protagonist’s intention which determines 
moral judgments, another type of scenario was introduced (Young et al., 2006, 2010). These 
scenarios, labeled beliefs scenarios here, describe a person knowingly (versus unknowingly) 
causing a negative outcome (e.g., someone’s death), that is, believing that his actions will 
(versus will not) lead to the negative outcome. The neural networks mostly involved in these 
types of moral judgments were found to be located in the temporal parietal junction (TPJ), a 
brain area the authors interpret to subserve false belief judgments (Saxe et al., 2003). In 
contrast to such a narrow view of a specific role of TPJ in Theory of Mind processing, a more 
frequent view is that TPJ is more broadly involved in general processes related to 
mentalizing, detecting multi-sensory integration incongruency (e.g. visual and proprioceptive 
signals from the body), and orienting attention away from self-related processing (Apperly et 
al. 2007; Decety & Lamm 2007; Mitchell 2005).  
From a third point of view, some scholars try to reconcile the contradictory positions 
mentioned above. Greene and colleagues proposed a dual-process theory for moral judgments 
(Greene et al., 2004). They argue in this theory that moral judgments result from multiple 
psychological systems, claiming that both conscious reasoning and emotions are involved in 
moral judgments and suggesting that moral intuitions may rely on both affective and 
cognitive mechanisms. Furthermore, these authors also stressed the point that different moral 
judgments are underpinned by different psychological systems (Cushman et al. 2010). 
Greene et al. (2001, 2004) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test 
this theory and to investigate the neural correlates of moral judgments in two moral scenarios 
Thomson (1986) introduced to the moral philosophy literature. These scenarios represent 
types of situations in which one person has the possibility to save a greater number of human 
lives (usually five people) at the expense of harming a smaller number of human lives 
(usually one person). In order to achieve this, in one case a person has to act on an object or 
tool to save lives (e.g., using a switch to deviate a runaway train from its path onto a side-
track where only one workman will be killed, to prevent it from killing a group of track 
workers, thereby acting in a utilitarian way), while in the other case the person has to act 
directly on another person to save the lives of a greater number of people (e.g., pushing 
someone from a bridge onto a track to prevent a train from killing a group of track workers). 
Thus, the scenarios differ with respect to the means by which the goal of saving the group of 
people is achieved. Typically, this difference leads respondents preferring utilitarian 
judgments in the first scenario, later labeled impersonal, while being less utilitarian in their 
judgments in the second scenario, labeled personal (Greene et al., 2001). The neuroimaging 
data obtained by Greene and colleagues (2001, 2004) suggested that emotional processes 
were predominantly active when respondents were making judgments about personal moral 
scenarios, in particular when judging whether it is impermissible to kill a person in order to 
save others. In contrast, cognitive mechanisms played a more important role when 
respondents were making judgments about impersonal moral judgments and when judging 
whether it is permissible to sacrifice one life to save a group of people in the personal moral 
scenarios (Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008). These results thus show that cognitive 
mechanisms inform moral judgments based predominantly on an action’s consequences 
(utilitarian judgments), while emotional mechanisms primarily inform moral judgments 
focusing on the means used to obtain a given outcome (deontological judgments). 
In line with these conclusions, several other studies suggest that emotions are indeed 
strongly involved in personal and less involved in impersonal moral judgments. For example, 
a behavioral study by Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006), using one personal and one impersonal 
moral scenario, showed that being in a more positive affective state increased the odds of 
judging the protagonist’s action morally permissible only in the personal moral scenarios. 
Moreover, lesion patients in a study involving patients with bilateral damage to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a brain area associated with affective valuation 
processes, judged the actions of protagonists in the personal moral scenarios, but not in the 
impersonal scenarios, to be morally permissible significantly more often than normal controls 
(Greene, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Young & Koenigs, 2007). Note however, that the 
interpretation of the Koenigs et al. findings is not univocal. In fact, while Moll and colleagues 
(2007) acknowledge that emotions are predominantly involved in personal scenarios, they 
propose an alternative explanation of these findings, suggesting that the moral judgments of 
patients with vmPFC lesion differ from those of healthy subjects because the former are 
unable (or less able) to experience prosocial moral sentiments. They are for this reason more 
prone to judge moral dilemmas in a more utilitarian fashion and not because they are unable 
to process emotionally salient information, as Greene (2007) suggests. 
Moll and colleagues’ interpretation is derived from a fourth theory on moral 
judgments which suggests that both emotions and conscious reasoning are involved in moral 
judgments, similarly to Greene’s theory. Contrary to the latter, however, which holds that 
some moral judgments can only entail emotional or cognitive processes, Moll’s position 
suggests that all moral scenarios will involve cognitive and emotional associations competing 
against each other at the moment of producing the corresponding moral judgment (Moll et al., 
2005, 2008).  
As the brief literature review makes clear, most of the research investigating the role 
of emotions for moral judgments focused primarily on the question of whether induced 
emotion has an effect on moral judgments. Empirical evidence has provided evidence for a 
role of emotions in moral judgments, speaking against those theories stating no causal role in 
moral judgments (Cima et al., 2010; Hauser et al., 2006; Huebner et al., 2008). Recently, 
some attempts have also tried to reconcile the contra posed views (Cushman et al., 2010). The 
main reasons for these contradictory findings and disagreement can be found in the fact that 
no study has systematically compared the interaction between different types of emotions on 
different types of moral dilemma. The present study aims at taking a first step in filling this 
gap. To do so, we focused on the motivational dimension of emotions and their differential 
role on moral judgments typically used in the literature.  
Recent research on social cognition has indicated that the effects of emotions on 
behavior can be better understood if emotions are classified according to their motivational 
dimension rather than their valence (Forgas, 2003; Harlé & Sanfey, 2010). More specifically, 
researchers investigating the relationship between motivation and emotion suggest classifying 
emotions according to approach and withdrawal motivational tendency rather than valence 
alone (Berkowitz, 2003; Harmon-Jones, 2004; Lang et al., 1997; Spielberg et al., 2008). 
Approach emotions are those which are more likely to result in behavior involving 
approaching a certain person, situation or event, while withdrawal emotions rather result in 
the opposite, namely, withdrawal of persons, situations, or events. Although other dimensions 
of emotions may be taken into consideration in order to predict their effects on moral 
decision making (Power and Dalgleish, 2008), we chose the motivational tendency as: a) in 
order to express their moral judgment on a given behavior, subjects are required to imagine 
the described action and have to decide whether they would endorse it or not, b) previous 
research on social decision making has mainly focused on the dimensions of motivational 
direction and valence. Harle and Sanfey (2010), for instance, predicted differential effects of 
emotions based on the motivational direction dimension, while others focused on the valence 
dimension (Schnall et al., 2008; Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006; and Wheatley and Haidt, 
2005). These studies provide a sufficient foundation for making differential predictions 
regarding how emotions would affect moral judgments if one or the other dimension prevails. 
In fact, testing two emotions with shared negative valence but opposite motivational 
tendencies (anger and disgust) allows us to formulate mutually exclusive predictions on the 
effect emotions one should expect on moral judgments (as described in detail below). 
To unveil whether emotions’ motivational dimension is crucial in determining 
differential effects on moral judgments, the present study was designed to investigate how 
emotions differing in motivational tendency influence moral judgments and how these effects 
depend on the type of moral scenario being judged. More specifically, we tested the effects of 
two primary negative emotions with equal valence but opposite motivational directions: 
anger (approach motivation) and disgust (withdrawal motivation). Furthermore, to assess 
whether the effect of induced emotions also depends on the type of moral scenario, this study 
directly compared moral judgments expressed on four types of moral scenarios. This entailed 
the inclusion of scenarios where we did not expect emotions to exert an effect on moral 
judgments. To this end, we used the four types of scenarios most commonly used in the 
literature and introduced in detail above: disgust-related moral vignettes (Haidt, 2001), 
impersonal and personal moral scenarios (Greene et al., 2001), and beliefs moral scenarios 
(Young et al., 2006). As participants were asked to evaluate whether a protagonist’s action 
was permissible in the scenarios, we predicted a differential effect of emotions on moral 
judgment depending on their motivational direction (approach vs. withdrawal). More 
specifically, given that approach emotions motivate one to engage in a physical interaction 
with someone else, approach emotions were expected to increase the number of 
permissibility judgments. In contrast, disgust should have the opposite effect, as it primes 
withdrawal action tendencies, resulting in a tendency to refrain from acting on a third party 
and leading to a decrease in judgments of moral permissibility. Thus, based on our main 
hypothesis that motivational direction rather than valence determines the effect of emotion on 
moral judgment, we predicted that anger and disgust – although both negative emotions – 
would have opposite effects on moral judgments. If, on the other hand, valence alone were 
the main determinant of the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments, we would 
expect to see similar effects for anger and disgust. 
Furthermore, we predicted that the observed effects on moral judgments should not 
only vary as a function of the type of emotion induced but also as a function of the type of 
moral scenario used. Based on the literature reviewed above, we predicted that emotions 
would have a stronger influence on moral judgments in the disgust-related and personal 
scenarios as compared to the impersonal or beliefs scenarios. Furthermore, disgust induction 
should have an especially strong effect on the disgust-related paradigms if the assumption 
that these judgments recruit general mechanisms evolved to process primary disgust in the 
human brain and body (Haidt, 2001) is correct. In contrast, emotions should not have an 
effect on moral judgments resulting from beliefs scenarios, as these mostly rely on inferences 
about abstract beliefs and about the protagonist's intentions in the scenario. Accordingly, 
brain areas such as the temporo-parietal junction (Young et at., 2006, 2010), which have been 
shown to subserve these types of inferences, are held to be part of domain-general processes 
(such as detecting incongruency or re-orienting attention; Decety & Lamm 2007). In contrast, 
brain structures directly associated with affective processing such as the insular cortex or the 
amygdala (Lamm & Singer, 2010; Singer, 2006), as well as the superior temporal sulcus 
which has been associated with emotional processing in moral judgments (Moll et al., 2005) 
do not seem to play a role in making belief inferences. 
Finally, previous findings suggest that emotions should affect personal more than 
impersonal scenarios (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 
2006; Young & Koenigs, 2007). 
Method 
We performed two experiments to test our predictions. Experiments 1a and 1b 
examined the effects of induced disgust on participants’ moral judgments assessed using the 
four types of moral scenarios mentioned above. In Experiment 1a, disgust was induced using 
a disgusting odor applied with a commercially available odor dispenser as in Schnall et al. 
(2008) (“fart spray” consisting of ammonium sulfide in water solution, which, when sprayed, 
results in a disgusting odor). As the results obtained in Experiment 1a did not replicate 
previous findings suggesting a priming effect of disgust induction on moral judgments 
(Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005), we performed another experiment using a 
different method for inducing disgust in Experiment 1b, where we used video clips with 
disgusting content, previously effectively used to induce disgust in an fMRI experiment 
performed by Harrison et al. (2007). In Experiment 2, we tested the effects of anger on moral 
judgments in the same types of moral scenarios used in Experiments 1a and 1b. 
Experiments 1a and 1b 
Participants 
Fifty-five undergraduate students took part in Experiment 1a (disgust induced via 
odor). After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: an experimental condition in which the emotion of disgust was induced (group 
disgust/odor, n = 30, 22 females) and a control condition where no emotion was induced 
(group disgust/odor-control, n = 29, 23 females). One hundred and nine undergraduate 
students participated in Experiment 1b (disgust induced via video clip). As in Experiment 1a, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: an experimental condition 
where disgust was induced (group disgust/video, n = 56, 42 females) and a control condition 
(group disgust/video-control, n = 53, 38 females). Participants received 20 Swiss francs for 
participating in these experiments. 
Procedure 
Emotion Induction 
In Experiment 1a, as in Schnall et al. (2008), disgust was induced by means of “fart sprays”. 
Before each experimental session, two consecutive sprays were applied to a trash bag placed 
below the desk at which participants sat during the experiment. Participants assigned to the 
control condition where no emotion was induced performed the experiment in an identical 
room but with a neutral ambient odor. In Experiment 1b, disgust was induced in the 
experimental group using a 2-minute video clip showing an actor interacting with human 
vomit (Harrison et al., 2007). The control group viewed a neutral 2-minute video clip of a 
person describing a painting. 
Moral Judgments 
Participants read 40 moral scenarios (translated into German), 10 per scenario type: 
disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs. For each scenario, they were to answer the 
question: “Is it morally permissible for the protagonist to do x,” to which they answered yes 
or no by pressing one of two buttons on the computer keyboard. These scenarios were taken 
from previous studies: disgust-related moral scenarios from Schnall et al. 2008, personal and 
impersonal ones from Greene et al. 2008 and 2009, and belief moral scenarios from Young et 
al. 2006. Of the belief moral scenarios, four described neutral intentions resulting in three 
neutral outcomes and one negative one, and the other six describing bad intentions, three 
resulting in neutral outcomes and three in negative ones. 
The order of presentation of the types of scenarios was randomized across subjects to 
exclude any presentation order effects on moral judgments. 
Manipulation Checks 
At the end of the study, participants reported on an 11-point scale (from not at all to 
very strongly) if and how strongly, after the induction, they felt any of the following 
emotions: anger, disgust, happiness, or sadness. Additionally, to assess possible differences in 
the decay of emotions over time, participants also reported how strongly they felt these 
emotions immediately before and after having responded to each moral scenario. 
Furthermore, participants were also asked to report whether and how strongly the emotion 
they felt might have influenced their moral judgments in order to assess possible effects of 
beliefs about the effect of emotions on behavior.  
In order to increase the sensitivity of our analyses, we used the results of these rating 
scales to exclude participants for whom the emotion induction did not work satisfactorily, 
that is, who did not show the expected affective responses intended by the emotion induction 
procedures. To be sure that the respective emotion had been successfully induced, 
participants of a given experimental group had to report an emotion intensity of five or higher 
(i.e., above the midpoint on the 11-point scale ranging from not at all to very strongly) for the 
target emotion (i.e., disgust for the disgust groups, anger for the anger group, see Experiment 
2). Participants of the control groups were included in the final analyses only if they reported 
emotion intensities of below five for all four emotions. In order to fully disclose the data 
obtained in our study, however, results will be reported for both the selected and the full 
sample. 
Experiment 2 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-two undergraduate students took part in Experiment 2 (anger 
induced via negative feedback). After providing informed consent, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: an experimental condition in which the emotion 
of anger was induced (group anger, n = 59, 23 females) and a control condition in which no 
emotion was induced (group anger-control, n = 63, 28 females). As in Experiments 1a and 
1b, participants received 20 Swiss francs for participating in the experiment. 
Procedure 
Emotion Induction 
Giving negative feedback on essays written by participants is a well-established 
technique for inducing anger (Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001). The technique proposed 
originally in the mentioned study was slightly modified. First, the participants actually met 
the other participants who corrected their essays at the beginning of the experiment. Second, 
every participant had to both write and correct an essay to increase the credibility of the 
procedure. Furthermore, as pretests had shown that feedback interpreted as neutral was hard 
to obtain using the original scale, the nine-point feedback scale used in the original version 
was modified to a scale with only three evaluation categories (negative, neutral, positive). 
Participants were given ten minutes to write a short essay discussing one of five 
controversial topics. One topic, for example, was “should alcoholic drinks be sold to people 
under 16 years of age.” Participants were allowed to decide which topic they wanted to 
discuss in their essay. After writing their essay, each participant received an essay written by 
another participant and evaluated it by giving either a negative, neutral, or positive evaluation 
based on four criteria: rationality, logic, interest, and intelligence. The experimenter then 
replaced these evaluation forms with pre-prepared evaluation forms used to induce anger, or 
no emotion, and gave them to the participants. Depending on their group assignment, 
participants received evaluations that were either negative or neutral on all four criteria. 
Please note that this procedure may have induced some complex social emotions such as 
shame or guilt, which were not controlled for given that our focus here were the effects of 
induced primary emotions on moral judgments. 
Moral Judgments and Manipulation Checks 
The procedures for moral judgments and manipulation checks were identical to those 
used in Experiments 1a and 1b. 
Statistical Analysis 
The moral judgment data were analyzed using a mixed-design analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with the between-subjects factors Group (two factor levels: experimental group, 
in which emotions had been induced, and control group, in which no emotions had been 
induced) and Emotion (two levels: Experiments 1a and b with the emotion of disgust; 
Experiment 2 with the emotion of anger), and the within-subjects factor Type of scenario (4 
factor levels: disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs). The dependent variable was 
the sum of permissible responses given for each type of scenario. Data from the experimental 
and control groups of Experiments 1a and 1b were analyzed together after ensuring that the 
two groups did not differ significantly (see results).  
The self-report data of the manipulation checks were analyzed as follows: In order to 
assess whether we had successfully induced emotions in the experimental groups, an 
ANOVA with the between-subjects factors Group and Emotion and the within-subjects factor 
Affect Rating (4 factor levels: anger, disgust, happiness, sadness) was performed. To 
establish whether anger and disgust intensity decayed over time and whether they differed 
with respect to decay, an ANOVA with the between-subjects factor Experimental Group (2 
factor levels: disgust group and anger group) and the within-subjects factors Affect Rating (2 
factor levels: induced disgust and induced anger) and Decay (2 factor levels: induced emotion 
at beginning, induced emotion at end) was performed. Finally, to test whether participants’ 
beliefs about the effects of an induced emotion on their moral judgments varied across 
emotions, we performed an ANOVA with the between-subjects factor Experimental Group 
and the within-subjects factor Influence (2 levels: influence of disgust on moral judgments 
and influence of anger on moral judgments). Violations of the sphericity assumption in 
ANOVA omnibus tests were corrected using the method proposed by Greenhouse and 
Geisser. A-priori and post-hoc hypotheses of specific differences between factor levels were 
assessed using linear contrasts computed with specific error variance terms (Boik, 1981). 
More specifically, a first set of planned comparisons assessed whether the emotion 
inductions were successful, as indicated by the affect ratings of the manipulation checks. To 
this end, linear contrasts assessed whether the ratings of the target emotion (disgust in 
Experiments 1a and 1b, anger in Experiment 2) were higher than the mean ratings of the non-
target emotions (happiness, sadness, and anger for Experiments 1a and 1b; happiness, 
sadness, and disgust for Experiment 2). These contrasts were calculated separately for the 
experimental and control group of Experiments 1a and 1b (pooled) and Experiment 2. To 
assess whether the intensity of the target emotions (disgust and anger) was equal in the 
corresponding experimental groups, another linear contrast compared the self-reported 
intensities (Anger vs. Disgust: Target Emotion Intensity). Similarly, a planned comparison 
contrasted the self-reported beliefs of the influence of the target emotions on moral 
judgments (Anger vs. Disgust: Influence) in order to assess the effect of participants’ beliefs 
about the influence of the induced emotions on their moral judgments.  
For moral judgments, a linear contrast was computed which tested whether the 
differences between the experimental groups and their respective control groups differed 
significantly, irrespective of the type of scenario (formally, corresponding to a contrast 
(Anger vs. Anger/Control) vs. (Disgust vs. Disgust/Control): mean of all scenarios) to assess 
whether the Group*Emotion interaction was driven by anger increasing judgments of moral 
permissibility and disgust decreasing them. Another linear contrast tested whether the 
induced emotions affected the disgust-related and the personal scenarios more than the 
impersonal and beliefs scenarios. This contrast compared the difference in judgments of 
moral permissibility between the two experimental groups (compared to their respective 
controls) for the disgust-related and personal scenarios with that difference in the impersonal 
and beliefs scenarios (i.e., (Anger vs. Anger/Control) vs. (Disgust vs. Disgust/Control): 
(Disgust-Related and Personal vs. Impersonal and Beliefs). Furthermore, given that our data 
revealed a different pattern of results, we also tested whether emotions affected the 
impersonal and the personal scenarios more than the disgust-related and beliefs scenarios. 
This contrast compared the difference in judgments of moral permissibility between the two 
experimental groups (compared to their respective controls) for the impersonal and personal 
scenarios with the difference in the disgust-related and beliefs scenarios (i.e., (Anger vs. 
Anger/Control) vs. (Disgust vs. Disgust/Control): (Impersonal and Personal vs. Disgust-
Related and Beliefs). 
In addition, we specifically test whether emotions have an effect on the beliefs 
scenarios, using another planned comparison that contrasted responses given in the beliefs 
scenarios, separately for the two emotion inductions ((Anger vs. Anger/Control): Beliefs and 
(Disgust vs. Disgust/Control): Beliefs). Finally, the last a priori contrast tested if induced 
disgust had an effect on the disgust-related moral scenarios (Disgust vs. Disgust/Control: 
Disgust-Related).  
ANOVAs were performed using SPSS (SPSS Statistics version 17.0) and linear 
contrasts using Statistica (Stata Soft Statistica version 7).  
Results 
Applying the exclusion criteria for emotion induction ratings explained above, a 
sample of 232 participants (143 females; 58 participants excluded) was selected for the 
analyses, composed of n = 56 participants (44 females; 30 participants excluded) in the two 
disgust groups, n = 80 participants in the disgust/control groups (58 females; 2 participants 
excluded), n = 42 participants in the anger group (18 females; 17 participants excluded), and 
n = 54 participants (23 females; 9 participants excluded) in the anger/control group. As an 
ANOVA with the between-subjects factor Experiment (2 levels: Experiment 1a and 
Experiment 1b) and the within-subjects factor Type yielded no between-subjects differences 
(F < 1 for the main effect Experiment, F (3, 402) = 39.918, p < 0.001 for the main effect 
Type, and F < 1 for the interaction Experiment*Type; full sample: main effect Experiment F 
< 1, F (3, 492) = 47.486, p < 0.001 for the main effect Type, and F < 1 for the interaction 
Experiment*Type), data from the experimental and control groups in Experiments 1a and 1b 
were treated together. 
Emotion Induction 
 
– Insert Table 1 here – 
 
As expected, all main effects (Group, Emotion and Affect Rating) as well as the 
interactions (Group*Emotion and Group*Emotion*Affect Rating) were significant. 
Furthermore, the interaction Affect Rating*Emotion and Affect Rating*Group were also 
significant. Table one above provides the full statistical analyses details. An overview of the 
self-rated emotion intensities for the selected samples can be found in Figure 1 below. 
Both methods used to induce disgust in Experiments 1a and 1b resulted in high 
average ratings of disgust in the full non-selected sample (Experiment 1a: M = 4.76, SEM = 
.443; Experiment 1b: M = 6.64, SEM = .354) as well as in the selected sample; the latter were 
obviously higher (Experiment 1a: M = 6.73, SEM = .228; Experiment 1b: M = 7.93, SEM = 
.235). Therefore, the analyses that follow on the data obtained in Experiments 1a and 1b are 
collapsed (Experiments 1a and 1b: M = 7.61, SEM = .195; full sample: M = 5.99, SEM = 
.293).  
Linear contrasts (statistics reported in detail in Table 2) revealed the following 
findings: The linear contrast comparing self-reported values of disgust intensity showed that 
disgust was felt significantly more strongly in the disgust groups than in their respective 
control groups. Furthermore, the linear contrast comparing the average ratings of the non-
target emotion intensities (anger, happiness, and sadness) did not reveal any significant 
differences. Additionally, disgust was felt significantly more strongly than the average of the 
other non-target emotions in the experimental group, as revealed by a linear contrast 
comparing disgust intensity against the non target emotions’ intensities. The disgust/control 
group was successfully kept in a neutral emotional state as shown by a linear contrast 
comparing the intensity of each emotion with the mean intensities of the other emotions. 
 
– Insert Table 2 here – 
 
In a similar vein, Experiment 2 revealed that anger was felt more strongly in the 
experimental group than in the control group, and the target emotion in the experimental 
group was felt significantly more strongly than the average of the non-target emotions. Note, 
however, that an examination of Figure 1 suggested that participants in the experimental 
group felt moderate levels of sadness. A post-hoc linear contrast computed to assess this 
observation revealed that sadness was significantly stronger in the anger group than in the 
control group. More importantly, a further linear contrast revealed that self-reported anger 
intensity in the experimental group was significantly higher than sadness. Comparing the 
self-rated intensities of emotions in the anger/control group revealed that no emotion was felt 
significantly more strongly than the average of the others.  
Finally, comparing emotion intensities in the experimental groups across the two 
experiments revealed that there was no difference in the intensities of the target emotions 
(disgust and anger). 
 
– Insert Figure 1 here – 
 
Analyses of the decay of the target emotions revealed that emotions were felt more 
strongly at the beginning than at the end of Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2 (Decay: F (1, 96) = 
91.797, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.489; full sample: F (1, 141) = 81.763, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.367). 
However, the main effects Experimental Group (F (1, 96) = 3.212, p = 0.076, ηp2 = 0.32; full 
sample: F (1, 141) = 2.153, p = 0.144, ηp2 = 0.15), and Affect Rating (F (1, 96) = 2.036, p < 
0.156, ηp2 = 0.014; full sample: F (1, 141) = 2.036, p = 0.156, ηp2 = 0.014) and the interaction 
Affect Rating*Decay (F < 1; Full sample: F < 1) did not reveal any significant differences. 
The interaction Experimental Group*Decay was not significant either (F < 1; full sample: F 
< 1), while the interaction Experimental Group*Affect Rating*Decay was significant (F (1, 
96) = 93.384, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.493; full sample F (1, 141) = 100.453, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 
0.416). The linear contrast (anger group vs. disgust group) vs. (induced emotion beginning 
vs. induced emotion end) showed that the two target emotions did not differ with respect to 
decay (F < 1; full sample F < 1). Finally, no general effect of the belief about the influence of 
induced emotions on moral judgments was revealed (main effect Influence: F (1, 96) = 1.632, 
p = 0.205, ηp2 = 0.017; full sample: F < 1, and Experimental Group: F < 1; full sample: F (1, 
141) = l.176, p = 0.280, ηp2 = 0.008). However, the interaction Experimental 
Group*Influence (F (1, 96) = 37.566, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.281 (Full Sample F (1, 141) = 
40.068, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.221)) was significant, reflecting that participants reported a slightly 
stronger influence of the induced target emotion on their moral judgments in the anger group 
than in the disgust group. The influence ratings, however, were comparably low for both 
groups (disgust influence M = 2.33 SEM = 0.401 and anger influence M = 1.77 SEM = 
0.272; full sample: disgust influence M = 1.57 SEM = 0.217 and anger influence M = 1.90 
SEM = 0.312), and their difference might also reflect presumed differences in influence 
explained ex post, rather than actual influence during judgments. 
Moral Judgments 
 
– Insert Table 3 here – 
 
As in the Emotion Induction results section, the full details of the statistical analyses 
are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 describes the ANOVA results (Group, Type, and 
Emotion), while Table 4 shows results of the linear contrasts. 
 
– Insert Figure 2 here – 
 The main effects of Group and Emotion, and the interactions Group*Type and 
Type*Emotion, were not significant. However, as expected, we observed a significant 
interaction Group*Emotion and a significant main effect of Type. Furthermore, the 
interaction Group*Emotion*Type revealed a tendency to significance at the 10% level (see 
Table 3). Figure 2 shows an overview of the moral permissibility judgments averaged by 
group. 
 
– Insert Table 4 here – 
 
The linear contrast assessing whether anger resulted in more judgments of moral 
permissibility than disgust was significant (see Table 4, first row). Further planned 
comparisons revealed that, contrary to our expectations, the disgust-related and personal 
scenarios did not differ significantly from the impersonal and beliefs scenarios (see Table 4, 
second row). However, the post-hoc comparison of personal and impersonal scenarios to 
disgust-related and beliefs scenarios revealed a significant difference (see Table 4, third row). 
They also revealed that neither of the two emotion inductions affected moral judgments in the 
beliefs scenarios. Contrary to our predictions, no effect of disgust on the disgust-related 
moral scenarios was found. Figure 3 shows the judgments of moral permissibility averaged 
by group for each type of moral scenario. Finally, an additional planned comparison revealed 
that emotions’ effect was not stronger for the personal than for the impersonal moral 
scenarios (see Table 4, fourth row). 
 
– Insert Figure 3 here – 
 
Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to investigate the effect of different emotions on 
different types of moral judgments. More specifically, we predicted that two types of 
negative emotions differing in the motivational tendency they elicit - approach vs. withdrawal 
- would have differential effects on different types of moral judgments. The induction of an 
approach emotion such as anger was expected to increase judgments of moral permissibility, 
while the induction of a withdrawal emotion such as disgust was expected to decrease them. 
Indeed, we expected the induction of an approach emotion to augment the participant’s 
predisposition to endorse the action described in the scenarios (e.g., pushing a person off the 
bridge or pushing a lever) and that they would therefore be inclined to judge such an action as 
morally permissible. On the contrary, the induction of a withdrawal emotion was expected to 
reduce the participant’s willingness to endorse the described action, resulting in judgment of 
such actions as not permissible. 
Furthermore, we predicted that the judgments of moral permissibility would not only 
be influenced by the type of emotion induced, but also by the type of scenario for which 
moral judgments were required. We thus utilized four types of frequently used moral 
scenarios, namely, disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs scenarios. Based on the 
existing evidence, we expected emotions to predominantly influence the disgust-related 
(Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) and personal moral scenarios (Greene et al., 
2001, 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006; Young & Koenigs, 2007), 
whereas a weaker effect was expected on the impersonal and beliefs moral scenarios. 
The results of the manipulation checks confirmed that a) the emotion induction 
procedures successfully induced the intended emotions in the experimental groups (see 
Figure 1; note also that even though our selection criteria were tailored to ensure the general 
trend of these findings, the analysis of the data of the non-selected sample delivered similar 
results for the manipulation checks); b) a neutral emotional state predominated in the control 
groups; c) no relevant differences were found between the experimental groups, neither 
concerning the decay of emotions over time nor the participants’ beliefs about the effect that 
emotions might have had on their moral judgments. Taken together, the results for the 
manipulation checks clearly show that our experimental manipulation successfully induced 
the desired emotional states in participants. The unexpected mild induction of sadness in the 
anger group is not problematic considering that a) anger was felt significantly more strongly 
than sadness, suggesting that the main group effects on moral judgments are attributable to 
the presence of anger and that b) the expected effects of sadness - a withdrawal emotion - on 
moral judgments might have counteracted the effects exerted by anger. Thus, the size of the 
effects of anger on moral judgments in the present study might have been underestimated and 
might be even stronger in the absence of concomitantly induced sadness (which is a 
withdrawal-related emotion). Finally, as we were primarily interested in the effects of 
induced basic emotions, we did not control for the induction of other more complex emotions 
such as guilt or shame, which might have resulted from the anger induction procedure. 
The significant interaction of group and emotion confirmed our first hypothesis of an 
effect of emotion induction on judgments of the permissibility of actions in different types of 
moral scenarios. More specifically, the tailored comparison of overall judgments of 
permissibility in the anger versus the disgust conditions confirmed that the former indeed 
resulted in more judgments of permissibility than the latter. These findings therefore support 
the hypothesis that motivational tendency is a crucial feature in determining how emotions 
affect moral judgments. Thereby, these results directly address the main objective motivating 
our study, which was to uncover the mechanisms by which emotions exert their influence on 
moral judgments. 
Furthermore, our results also support the prediction that the influence of emotions also 
depends on the types of moral scenarios in which moral judgments were requested. However, 
not all of our predictions were confirmed. In one sense, the results confirm that emotion 
effects are particularly strong for moral judgments in personal moral scenarios, and basically 
absent for those expressed in belief moral scenarios. Contrary to our predictions, however, 
emotions influenced moral judgments in the impersonal moral scenarios, and not in the 
disgust-related ones. The latter observation was particularly surprising, as it stands against 
previously reported findings (Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) suggesting that 
the emotion of disgust plays a crucial role in moral judgment. 
As mentioned, we also did not observe stronger effects of emotions on personal 
compared to impersonal scenarios (see also Table 4), indicating that the experimental 
induction of emotions also affects impersonal moral judgments and that emotion induction 
effects for them are similar in size to those observed for the personal scenarios. This might 
seem at odds with theoretical arguments in the field of moral psychology suggesting that 
moral judgments triggered by impersonal scenarios are less likely to entail a spontaneous 
emotional response than personal scenarios (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007; 
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006; Young & Koenigs, 2007). The present results, therefore, point 
to two possible roles of emotions when judging these two similar types of moral scenarios. 
While previous research (Greene et al., 2001, 2004) suggests that personal scenarios 
spontaneously recruit affective processes more extensively, experimentally inducing 
emotions seems to affect judgments in both types of scenarios in a similar way. As a possible 
mechanism, we suggest that induced emotions possibly override the tendency of personal 
scenarios to spontaneously elicit affective states. 
The specific effects of emotion induction on impersonal and personal but not disgust 
and belief moral scenarios observed in our data might be accounted for in several ways. A 
first explanation could be the fact that when evaluating the personal and impersonal moral 
scenarios, the subject is asked to evaluate whether it is permissible for him/her to perform the 
described action from a first-person perspective (e.g., is it permissible for you to push a man 
off the bridge?), while in the disgust-related and belief scenarios the action judged is 
performed by a third party (e.g. is it permissible for A to bribe B?). Although plausible, this 
explanation is not totally convincing, as previous findings document that emotions influence 
moral judgments in both cases, i.e., when the judged action is performed by a third party 
(Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2006), or when it is performed in first person 
(Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). 
In line with Greene et al. (2009) and with our assumption that the impact of emotions 
on moral judgments may depend on the motivational action tendency of emotions, an 
alternative explanation for the unexpected effects may be that induced emotions particularly 
influence moral scenarios entailing a strong action demand. In fact, while the personal and 
impersonal scenarios require one to imagine performing an effortful action, such as pushing a 
man or a lever, the disgust related and belief scenarios do not require such action imagery. 
Future studies will have to provide empirical evidence to clarify which features are most 
likely to drive the observed effects of emotions induction on moral judgments. Additional 
features such as differences in syntactic or text complexity, response times, familiarity, 
emotional salience, degree of conflict of each moral scenario will have to be controlled by 
such investigations as well. 
The absence of emotion induction effects on beliefs paradigms is in line with our 
predictions and with previous findings reporting that the brain areas recruited to make this 
type of moral judgment are usually associated with detecting multi-sensory integration 
incongruence (e.g. visual and proprioceptive signals from the body), mentalizing, and re-
orienting attention from self- to other-related processing (Decety & Lamm 2007). 
Furthermore, previous studies investigating moral judgments given during belief scenarios 
did not find an increase in activation of brain areas directly linked with affective processing 
during moral judgments (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2002) or with affective brain 
networks known to support emotions and empathy (Lamm and Singer, 2010; Singer, 2006; 
Singer & Lamm, 2009), reported by other studies. However, the lack of an influence of 
disgust induction on moral judgments for the disgust-related scenarios is surprising given the 
results of previous studies (Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). As possible 
reasons accounting for this discrepancy between current and previous findings, we can 
exclude an inefficiency of the chosen disgust induction procedures in Experiments 1a and 1b. 
Our analyses clearly confirmed that: a) the disgust induction led to reliably stronger 
subjective reports of feelings of disgust as compared to other emotions in both experiments, 
as well as to a comparable self-rated emotion intensity as compared to the anger induction, b) 
the disgust induction did not show any reliable effect on disgust-related moral judgments 
even for the participants selected on the basis of high emotion induction ratings (see Figure 
1), and c) the disgust induction had considerable effects on judgments in two other types of 
moral scenarios for the same participants (the personal and impersonal scenarios) in both 
Experiments 1a and 1b. 
However, the different response format used in our and in previous studies might 
explain the discrepancy in results. While participants in the two previous studies showing 
disgust-related effects (Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2006) were asked to quantify 
the wrongness of a moral violation on a scale from zero to one hundred, participants in our 
experiments were asked to evaluate whether the situation described in the scenario is morally 
acceptable or not. This may have resulted in a floor effect in the control group, leaving no 
space to observe a possible effect of disgust on moral judgments. In other words, the 
reference baseline of judgments of permissibility given by the participants kept in a neutral 
emotional state in our study might already have been too low to allow for observing an effect 
of disgust in the disgust-related scenarios. Another possible reason for the different findings 
may be related to cross-cultural differences. The disgust-related scenarios used in our and 
previous studies were designed to represent stereotypical violations of US American moral 
norms and they may have had different effects on the Swiss-German sample investigated in 
our study. 
In summary, our study allows us to draw some important conclusions on the 
relationship between emotions and moral judgments. First, our results show that 
experimentally induced emotions play a direct causal role in determining moral judgments, 
contradicting arguments in moral psychology that emotions are not involved in moral 
judgments. Second and most importantly, our findings contribute to a better understanding of 
the mechanisms by which emotions influence moral judgments, showing that action 
motivational tendencies predict how moral judgments will be influenced by emotions: while 
anger as an approach emotion increased judgments of moral permissibility, the withdrawal 
emotion of disgust decreased them. We propose that this effect was modulated by the 
differences in the action demands implied by moral scenarios. As both impersonal and 
personal moral scenarios involve stronger action demands compared to disgust-related and 
beliefs scenarios, the induction of emotions had a stronger influence on the former two.  
In conclusion, the present work demonstrates that experimentally induced emotions 
causally influence moral judgments and that this influence critically depends on the type of 
emotion induced and the type of moral scenario evaluated. We believe that the role played by 
more complex moral emotions such as contempt or indignation also strongly depends on the 
elements involved in the moral scenarios judged and on the motivational tendencies these 
complex emotions induce. Our data are compatible with the view that moral judgments result 
from a combination of both emotional intuitions and reasoning, and that the relevance of each 
of these mechanisms depends on the moral scenario being evaluated. To get a better 
understanding of the mechanisms by which emotions influence moral judgments, future 
studies will have to determine how factors such as valence, motivational tendency of 
emotions, and action demands of the decisions collaborate in influencing moral judgments. 
For this, a better taxonomy as well as better standards of normative empirical data on the 
psycholinguistic, emotional and other variables characterizing the moral scenarios used in 
research is needed, allowing for a priori classification of the cognitive, affective, and action-
related components needed to make judgments about different types of moral scenarios (see 
also Knutson et al., 2010). Finally, the present study focused only on the role of different 
types of emotions on moral judgments but ignored moral actions. The observed effects of 
emotions on moral decision making and behavior may be even stronger when participants are 
actually required to perform moral actions, and not only to judge their permissibility. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary of the ANOVA results for the self-reported emotion ratings. 
Selected Sample Full Sample 
ANOVA results F-value (df) P Value ηp2 F-value (df) P Value ηp2 
Group F (1, 228) = 466.002 < 0.001 0.671 F (1, 282) = 177.562 < 0.001 0.386 
Emotion F (1, 228) = 38.915 < 0.001 0.146 F (1, 282) = 34.921 < 0.001 0.110 
Affect Rating F (3, 684) = 92.928 < 0.001 0.290 F (3, 846) = 92.928 < 0.001 0.290 
Group*Emotion F (1, 228) = 10.03 0.002 0.042 F (1, 282) = 2.199 0.139 0.008 
Group*Affect Rating F (3, 684) = 103.521 < 0.001 0.312 F (3, 846) = 43.402 < 0.001 0.133 
Emotion*Affect Rating F (3, 684) = 150.857 < 0.001 0.398 F (3, 846) = 93.818 < 0.001 0.250 
Group*Emotion*Affect Rating F (3, 684) = 166.228 < 0.001 0.422 F (3, 846) = 79.525 < 0.001 0.220 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of the statistics for analyses of the self-reported emotion ratings assessed 
by means of linear contrasts. Capital letters abbreviations A, AC, D, and DC refer to the 
Anger, Anger/Control, Disgust, and Disgust/Control groups respectively. Non-capital letters 
abbreviations a.i., d.i., h.i., and s.i. refer to induced emotion intensity, respectively: anger 
intensity, disgust intensity, happiness intensity, and sadness intensity. 
Selected Sample Full Sample 
Linear contrasts F-value (df) P Value F-value (df) P Value 
 
D vs. DC: d.i. F (1,228) = 531.837 < 0.001 F (1,282) = 263.497 < 0.001 
 
D vs. DC: a.i., h.i, s.i. F (1,228) = 1.753 0.187 F < 1 - 
 
D: d.i. vs. a.i., h.i., s.i.  F (1,228) = 631.186 < 0.001 F (1,282) = 430.289 < 0.001 
 
DC: d.i. vs. a.i., h.i., s.i.  F < 1 - F < 1 - 
 
DC: a.i. vs. d.i., h.i., s.i.  F (1,228) = 2.04 0.155 F (1,282) = 1.018 0.314 
 
DC: h.i. vs. d.i., a.i., s.i.  F (1,228) = 1.731 0.19 F < 1 - 
 
DC: s.i. vs. d.i., a.i., h.i.  F < 1 - F < 1 - 
A vs. AC: a.i. F (1,228) = 638.529 < 0.001 F (1,282) = 153.656 < 0.001 
A vs. AC: d.i., h.i, s.i. F (1,228) = 1.753 0.187 F (1,282) = 1.006 0.317 
A vs. AC: s.i. F (1,228) = 44.485 < 0.001 F (1,282) = 42.826 < 0.001 
A: a.i. vs. d.i., h.i., s.i.  F (1,228) = 644.232 < 0.001 F (1,282) = 256.7 < 0.001 
 
A: a.i. vs. s.i. F (1,228) = 141.415 < 0.001 F (1,282) = 80.142 < 0.001 
AC: a.i. vs. d.i., h.i., s.i.  F (1,228) = 2.04 0.155 F (1,282) = 3.19 0.075 
 
AC: a.i. vs. a.i., h.i., s.i.  F < 1 - F < 1 - 
 
AC: h.i. vs. a.i., a.i., s.i.  F (1,228) = 1.731 0.19 F (1,282) = 1.29 0.256 
 
AC: s.i. vs. a.i., a.i., h.i.  F < 1 - F < 1 - 
A: a.i. vs. D: d.i. F < 1 - F < 1 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of the ANOVA results for the analyses of moral judgments. 
Selected Sample Full Sample 
ANOVA results F-value (df) P Value ηp2 F-value (df) P Value ηp2 
Group F < 1 - - F (1,282) = 2.38 0.124 0.080 
Emotion F (1,228) = 2.95 0.085 0.130 F (1,282) = 3.983 0.047 0.140 
Type F (3,684) = 70.428 < 0.001 0.236 F (3,846) = 98.269 < 0.001 0.258 
Group*Emotion F (1,228) = 6.989 0.009 0.030 F (1,282) = 2.199 0.139 0.008 
Group*Type F < 1 - - F < 1 - - 
Emotion*Type F (3,684) = 1.756 0.164 0.080 F (3, 846) = 1.108 0.340 0.040 
Group*Emotion*Type F (3, 684) = 2.45 0.073 0.011 F (3,846) = 2.218 0.095 0.008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of the statistics for analyses of the moral judgments assessed by means of 
linear contrasts. As in Table 1 capital letter abbreviations refer to each group respectively. 
Non-capital abbreviations, b, dr, i, and p, refer to the type of moral dilemma, respectively: 
beliefs, disgust-related, impersonal and personal. 
Selected Sample Full Sample 
Linear contrasts F-value (df) 
P 
Value F-value (df) P Value 
(A vs. AC) vs. (D vs. DC): mean (dr, i, p, b) F (1,228) = 6.989 0.009 
 
F (1,282) = 7.909 0.005 
(A vs. AC) vs. (D vs. DC): mean (dr, p) vs. (i, b) F (1,228) = 3.532 0.199 F (1, 282) = 2.136 0.145 
(A vs. AC) vs. (D vs. DC): mean (i, p) vs. (dr, b) F (1,228) = 4.140 0.043 F (1,282) = 3.138 0.070 
(A vs. AC) vs. (D vs. DC): mean (i) vs. (p) F < 1 F < 1  - 
A vs. AC: b F < 1 - F < 1 - 
D vs. DC: b F < 1 - F < 1 - 
D vs. DC: dr F < 2 - F < 1 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1 Self-reported emotion intensity (M +/- SEM) for the selected participants in the 
experimental and control groups. Ratings were provided on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 
(extremely) in response to the question “How strongly did you feel this emotion?” 
 
Figure 2 Mean (+/- SEM) of affirmative judgments of moral permissibility summed over all 
forty moral judgments, in response to the question “Is it morally permissible for the 
protagonist to do x,”. 
 
Figure 3 Mean (+/- SEM) of affirmative judgments of moral permissibility separated by the 
four types of moral scenarios, with 10 judgments each. 
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